Hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods for cryptographically processing data as a function of a Cassels-Tate pairing are described. In one aspect, a Shafarevich-Tate group is generated from an abelian variety. A Cassels-Tate pairing is determined as a function of elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group. Data is then cryptographically processed as a function of the Cassels-Tate pairing by using Kolyvagin cohomology classes to hash the data into an element of the Shafarevich-Tate group.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This patent application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/011,289, filed on Dec. 14, 2004, titled “Cryptographically Processing Data Based on a Cassels-Tate Pairing”, assigned hereto, and incorporated by reference.

BACKGROUND

Existing pairing based cryptographic systems use Weil or Tate pairings evaluated at points on an elliptic curve or abelian variety. For a fixed natural number m, the Weil pairing e_(m) is a bilinear map that takes as input two m-torsion points on an elliptic curve, and outputs an m th root of unity.

SUMMARY

This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the detailed description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

In view of the above, hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety is described. In one aspect, a Shafarevich-Tate group is a subgroup of a Galois cohomology group of an abelian variety. A Cassels-Tate pairing is determined as a function of elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group. Data is then cryptographically processed with the Cassels-Tate pairing by using Kolyvagin cohomology classes to hash the data into an element of the Shafarevich-Tate group.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the Figures, the left-most digit of a component reference number identifies the particular Figure in which the component first appears.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary system for cryptographically processing data based on a Cassels-Tate pairing. To this end, the system hashes byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety.

FIG. 2 shows an exemplary procedure to cryptographically process data based on a Cassels-Tate pairing. The cryptographic processing includes hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety.

FIG. 3 shows an exemplary procedure to digitally sign data using a Cassels-Tate pairing. The process to digitally sign the data hashes byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety.

FIG. 4 shows an exemplary procedure for identity-based encryption using Cassels-Tate pairing. The identity-based encryption operations hash byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a suitable computing environment in which cryptographic processing data based on a Cassels-Tate pairing may be fully or partially implemented. The cryptographic processing operations hash byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Overview

The systems and methods hash byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety, as described below in reference to FIGS. 1 through 5, when cryptographically processing data using a Cassels Tate pairing. These systems (e.g., systems, apparatus, computer-readable media, means, etc.) and methods provide an alternative to all pairing-based systems that use the Weil or Tate pairings evaluated at points on an elliptic curve or abelian variety. Additionally, the systems and methods have applications in all pairing applications on the Shafarevich-Tate group. Producing non-trivial elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety is an existing problem in mathematics. The systems and methods for hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety construct Kolyvagin cohomology classes to produce provably non-trivial elements.

These and other aspects of the systems and methods to hash byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety are now described in greater detail.

An Exemplary System

Although not required, the systems and methods for hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety are described in the general context of computer-executable instructions (program modules) being executed by a computing device such as a personal computer. Program modules generally include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc., that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types. While the systems and methods are described in the foregoing context, acts and operations described hereinafter may also be implemented in hardware.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary system 100 to hash byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety, for example, when cryptographically processing data based on a Cassels-Tate pairing. As such, system 100 provides an alternative to pairing-based systems based on the Weil or Tate pairings evaluated at points on an elliptic curve or abelian variety. System 100 uses the group of points on the Shafarevich-Tate group of an elliptic curve or abelian variety, combined with the Cassels-Tate pairing on this group. System 100 may implement the operations for Cassels-Tate pairing in a cryptosystem using any one of many known pairing-based cryptographic protocols. For example, in one implementation, system 100 implements protocols based on identity-based cryptographic algorithms such as those directed to signatures (plain, blind, proxy, ring, undeniable, etc), encryption, authenticated encryption, broadcast encryption, encryption with keyword search, batch signatures, key agreement (plain, authenticated, group, etc.), trust authorities and public key certification, hierarchical cryptosystems, threshold cryptosystems and signatures, chameleon hash and signatures, authentication, applications and systems, or the like.

In other implementation(s), system 100 for hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety to cryptographic processing based on a Cassels-Tate pairing implements one or more of the following protocols based on: access control, key agreement, non-interactive key distribution, credentials (anonymous, hidden, self-blindable), secret handshakes, provably secure signatures, short signatures, aggregate, ring, and verifiably encrypted signatures, blind and partially blind signatures, proxy signatures, undeniable signatures, signcryption, multisignatures and threshold signatures, limited-verifier and designated-verifier signatures, threshold cryptosystems, hierarchical and role-based cryptosystems, chameleon hash and signatures, verifiable random functions, strongly insulated encryption, intrusion-resilient encryption, certificate-less PKC, a1, traitor tracing, or the like.

System 100 includes computing device 102 coupled over a network 103 to a networked computing device 104. Computing device 102 includes program module(s) 106 and program data 108. Program modules 106 include, for example, signing/encrypting module 110 to respectively encrypt or sign original data (a respective portion of “other data” 112) using: (a) a group of points on a Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of an elliptic curve or abelian; and, (b) an associated Cassels-Tate pairing 116. For purposes of illustration, original data that has been respectively signed or encrypted by signing/encrypting module 110 is shown in the program data portion of computing device 102 as encrypted or signed data 118.

Networked computing device 104 of FIG. 1 also includes program modules and program data. For example, networked computing device 104 includes verifying/decrypting module 120 to respectively decrypt or verify encrypted or signed data 118 (received from computing device 102) as a function of a Cassels-Tate pairing 122 that is generated by verifying/decrypting module 120 as a function of elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 (received from computing device 102). These and other aspects of system 100 are now described in greater detail.

Shafarevich-Tate Group

Shafarevich-Tate group 114 is a subgroup of a cohomology group 124. Shafarevich-Tate group 114 provides security to system 100 as a function of the hardness of discrete log in the Shafarevich-Tate group 114. Shafarevich-Tate group 114 is defined as follows. If K is a number field 124, denote by M_(K) the set of nonequivalent valuations on K. Denote by K_(v) a completion of K with respect to the metric induced by a prime v and by k_(v) the residue field. In general, if ƒ:G→G′ is a morphism of groups denote its kernel by G_(ƒ). If φ:A→B is an isogeny of abelian varieties, denote by A_(φ) the kernel of φ, and by {circumflex over (φ)} the dual isogeny {circumflex over (B)}→Â. For a field K and a smooth commutative K-group scheme G, we write H^(i)(K,G) to denote the group cohomology H^(i)(Gal(K_(s)/K),G(K_(s))), where K_(s) is a fixed separable closure of K.

In view of the above, Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of an abelian variety is defined. Let A be an abelian variety over a number field K. The Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of A, which is defined below, measures the failure of the local-to-global principle for certain torsors. A Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of A over K is ${{III}\left( {A/K} \right)}:={{{Ker}\left( {{H^{1}\left( {K,A} \right)}->{\prod\limits_{v\quad\varepsilon\quad M_{K}}^{\quad}{H^{1}\left( {K_{v},A} \right)}}} \right)}.}$

Cassels-Tate Pairing

Let A be an abelian variety defined over a number field K. The Cassels-Tate (“CT”) pairing (e.g., 116 or 122), CT(*,*), is a bilinear, anti-symmetric, non-degenerate pairing (modulo the divisible subgroup) of III(A/K) with III(Â/K) taking values in Q/Z. The CT pairing is written as a sum of local pairings (e.g., local pairings 126). Each local pairing is evaluated by a combination of evaluations of the Tate pairing, the Weil pairing, and the Hilbert symbol with respect to m. Special cases of the pairing on A, an elliptic curve, can be evaluated more simply using known techniques (e.g., techniques described in C. Beaver, “5-torsion in the Shafarevich-Tate group of a family of elliptic curves”, J. Number Theory, 82(1):25-46, 2000).

More particularly, let A be an abelian variety over a number field K with dual Â. The Cassels-Tate pairing CT(*,*) is a pairing such that CT:III(A/K)×III(Â/K)→Q/Z, which is non-degenerate modulo the divisible group. A definition in a special case follows. (For a general definition see William G. McCallum, “On the Shafarevich-Tate group of the Jacobian of a quotient of the Fermat curve”, Invent. Math., 93(3):637-666, 1988 (I, Proposition 6.9). For other equivalent definitions see also Bjorn Poonen and Micheal Stoll, “The Cassels-Tate pairing on polarized abelian varieties”, Ann. of Math. (2), 150(3):1109-1149, 1999.) Let φ,ψ be isogenies of A over K. The restriction of the Cassels-Tate pairing is restricted to the kernels of φ and {circumflex over (ψ)}.

There are exact sequences $0->{{A_{\psi}\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}->{{{A_{\phi\psi}\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}\overset{\psi}{\longrightarrow}{A_{\phi}\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}}->0}}$ and $0->{{A_{\phi}\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}->{{{A\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}\overset{\phi}{\longrightarrow}{A\left( \overset{\_}{K} \right)}}->0.}}$ If * is a global cohomology class, cocycle, or cochain, we write *_(v) for the corresponding local object. Let a∈III(A/K)_(φ) and a′∈III(K,Â)_({circumflex over (ψ)}). We define CT(a,a′). Choose elements b and b′ of H¹(K,A_(φ)) and H¹(K,Â_({circumflex over (ψ)})) mapping to a and a′ respectively. For each v, a maps to zero in H¹(K_(v),A), and so we can lift b_(v) to an element b_(v,1)∈H¹(K_(v),A_(φψ)) that is in the image of A(K_(v)). Suppose that a is divisible by ψ in H¹(K,A), say a=ψa₁, and choose an element b₁∈H¹(K,A_(φψ)) mapping to a₁. Then b_(v,1)-b_(1,v) maps to zero under H¹(K_(v),A_(φψ))→H¹(K_(v),A_(φ)), and so it is the image of an element c_(v) in H¹(K_(v),A_(ψ)). Then we define CT(a,a′) to be ${{{CT}\left( {a,a^{\prime}} \right)} = {\sum\limits_{v\quad\varepsilon\quad M_{K}}^{\quad}{{inv}_{v}\left( {c_{v}\bigcup b_{v}^{\prime}} \right)}}},$ where the cup-product is induced by the Weil pairing e _(ψ) :A _(ψ) ×Â _({circumflex over (ψ)}) →G _(m).

By the cup-product induced by the Weil pairing we mean the composition ${{H^{1}\left( {K_{v},A_{\psi}} \right)} \times {H^{1}\left( {K_{v},{\hat{A}}_{\hat{\psi}}} \right)}}->{{H^{2}\left( {K_{v},{A_{\psi} \otimes {\hat{A}}_{\hat{\psi}}}} \right)}\overset{e_{\psi}}{\longrightarrow}{H^{2}\left( {K_{v},G_{m}} \right)}}$ of the regular cup-product with the map on cohomology induced by the Weil pairing. The map inv_(v) is the canonical map H²(K_(v),G_(m))→Q/Z. (The image of inv_(v) lies inside m⁻¹Z/Z.)

A Cassels-Tate pairing 122 is described as a sum of local pairings. More particularly, suppose that the map of Galois modules ψ:A _(φψ)( K )→A _(φ)( K ) has a Galois invariant section s: A _(φ)( K )→A _(φψ)( K ). Then we can take a₁=s*a. We will now express the Cassels-Tate pairing 122 as a sum of local pairings. Let III:=III(A/K) and III′:=III(Â/K). Let S_(φ) be the Selmer group, which is a subset of H¹(K,A_(φ)) defined by the exact sequence 0→A(K)/φA(K)→S _(φ) →III _(φ)→0. Also, let S_({circumflex over (ψ)}) be the {circumflex over (ψ)}-Selmer group, which is defined by the corresponding exact sequence for {circumflex over (ψ)}. We can now lift the Cassels-Tate pairing to S_(φ)×S_({circumflex over (ψ)}). Then the pairing on the Selmer group is described as a sum of local pairings. The motivation for this is the following. We will apply this for φ=ψ. There is small chance of computing III_(φ) directly, but we may be able to compute the Selmer group S_(φ). The lift of the Cassels-Tate pairing to the Selmer group S_(φ)×S_({circumflex over (φ)}) is trivial on elements coming from A(K)/φA(K). So if the Cassels-Tate pairing on S_(φ)×S_({circumflex over (φ)}) is nontrivial, then we must have nontrivial φ-torsion in III.

By the definition of III, the third vertical map in

is 0. Hence we get a map l_(v,φ):S_(φ)→A(K_(v))/φA(K_(v)). We use l_(v,φ) to map the Selmer group into the local groups A(K_(v))/φA(K_(v)). We can now define a local pairing <,>_(v) ^(φ,ψ) :A(K _(v))/φA(K _(v))×Â(K _(v))/{circumflex over (ψ)}Â(K _(v))→Q/Z such that for b∈S_(φ) and b′∈S′_({circumflex over (ψ)}) we have ${{CT}\left( {b,b^{\prime}} \right)} = {\sum\limits_{v\quad\varepsilon\quad M_{K}}^{\quad}{\left\langle {{l_{v,\phi}(b)},{l_{v,{\hat{p}{si}}}\left( b^{\prime} \right)}} \right\rangle_{v}^{\phi,\psi}.}}$

Definition of the Local Pairing

To define the local pairing (e.g., local pairings 126), “<,>_(v) ^(φ,ψ)”, we consider the following diagram

Let x∈A(K_(v))/φA(K_(v)), x′∈Â(K_(v))/{circumflex over (ψ)}Â(K_(v)). Let x₁ be a lifting of x to A(K_(v))/φψA(K_(v)). Then i_(φψ)(x₁) and s*i_(φ)(x) both have the same image in H¹(K_(v),A_(φ)), hence (i_(φψ)(x₁)−s*i_(φ)(x)) is the image of an element c_(v)∈H¹(K_(v),A_(ψ)). Define <x,x′> _(v) ^(φ,ψ) =inv _(v) [c _(v) ∪i _({circumflex over (ψ)})(x′)].

The local pairing <,>_(v) ^(φ,ψ) is a bilinear pairing of abelian groups. The Cassels-Tate pairing 122 on S_(φ)×S′_({circumflex over (ψ)}) may be expressed as a sum of local pairings as in McCallum (McC88 p. 640) ${{{CT}\left( {b,b^{\prime}} \right)} = {\sum\limits_{v\quad\varepsilon\quad M_{K}}^{\quad}\left\langle {{l_{v,\phi}(b)},{l_{v,\phi}\left( b^{\prime} \right)}} \right\rangle_{v}^{\phi,\psi}}},$ and the following lemma there reduces the above sum to a finite sum: if v is a complex Archimedean valuation, or if v is non-archimedean, A has good reduction modulo the maximal ideal of v, and v(deg(φ)deg(ψ))=0, then <,>_(v) ^(φ,ψ) is trivial.

Heegner Points and the Kolyvagin Construction

Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over Q of conductor N. Let K=Q(√{square root over (−D)}), where −D is a fundamental discriminant, D≠3,4 and all prime factors of N are split in K. By the modularity theorem, there is a modular parametrization Φ:X₀(N)→E. Let O be the ring of integers of K and N⊂O be an ideal, such that O/N≅Z/NZ. Then O and N are Z-lattices of rank 2 in C and C/O→C/N⁻¹ is a cyclic isogeny of degree N between the elliptic curves C/O and C/N⁻¹ (here N⁻¹ denotes the fractional ideal of O for which NN⁻¹=O). This isogeny corresponds to a complex point x₁∈X₀(N). According to the theory of complex multiplication, the point x₁ is defined over the Hilbert class field K₁ of K.

More generally, let O_(n)=Z+nO be the order of index n in O and let N_(n)=N∩O_(n). Then O_(n)/N_(n)≅Z/NZ and the map C/O_(n)→C/N_(n) ⁻¹ is a cyclic isogeny of degree N and thus, it defines a complex point x_(n) on X₀(N). Again, by the theory of complex multiplication, this point is defined over the ring class field K_(n) of conductor n over K.

System 100 utilizes the parametrization Φ: X₀(N)→E to obtain points y_(n)=Φ(x_(n)). The point y_(K)=Tr_(K) ₁ _(/K)(y₁) is uniquely defined up to a torsion point for the different choices of the ideal N and in this implementation, is referred to as the Heegner point for the discriminant D. Kolyvagin used the points y₁ for suitably chosen indices 1 to define cohomology classes d_(1,p)∈H¹(K,E)[p] which are locally trivial at all but possibly a single place. A brief account of the construction is now provided.

Consider the primes 1, satisfying the following conditions

-   1 is inert in K=Q(√{square root over (−D)}). -   The conjugacy class of Frob₁ in Gal(K(E[p])/K) is the same as the     conjugacy class of complex conjugation (which we denote by     Frob_(˜)).     This condition is equivalent to the following two congruences:     a ₁≡1+1≡0 mod p,     where a₁ is the trace of the Frobenius on the Tate module T₁E.

For each such 1, let λ denote the unique prime of K above 1 and let G₁=Gal(K₁/K₁). Then G₁≅(O_(K)/IO_(K))^(x)/(Z/1Z)^(x)≅F_(λ)/F₁ would be cyclic of order 1+1, so system 100 can select a generator σ₁∈G₁. Let ${Tr}_{1} = {\sum\limits_{i = 0}^{1}\sigma_{1}^{i}}$ and let D₁∈Z[G₁] be selected in such a way that (σ₁−1)·D ₁=1+1−Tr ₁. Let G₁ denote the Galois group Gal(K₁/K) and let S⊂G₁ be a system of coset representatives for G₁/G₁. It is shown that the image of D₁y₁ in E(K₁)/pE(K₁) is fixed by G₁. Thus, if we set ${P_{1} = {\sum\limits_{{\sigma\varepsilon}\quad S}^{\quad}{\sigma\left( {D_{1}y_{1}} \right)}}},$ then the image b₁ of P₁ in E(K₁)/pE(K₁) is fixed by G₁. To define the classes, we consider the restriction map φ:H¹(K,E)[p]→H¹(K₁,E)[p]^(G) ¹ which is an isomorphism, so we can define the cohomology class c_(1,p)=φ⁻¹(δ(b))∈H ¹(K,E[p]).

Let d_(1,p) be the image of that class in H¹(K,E)[p]. The basic property of d_(1,p) is that it is locally trivial at all but possibly one place (the place λ). The below proposition follows.

Proposition 1: The class d_(1,p) is locally trivial at all places v≠λ of K (archimedian or non-archimedian), i.e. res_(v)(d_(1,p))=0 for all v≠λ. At the place λ, res_(λ)(d_(1,p))=0 if and only if y_(K)∈pE(K_(λ)). This proposition implies that the classes d_(1,p) are very close to being elements of III(E/K). To use those classes for cryptographic applications, one chooses primes 1, such that d_(1,p) is trivial at the place λ. According to the above proposition, this condition is expressible purely in terms of p-divisibility of the Heegner point y_(K) inside E(K_(λ)).

The Hash Function

For cryptographic processing, system 100 utilizes a hash function based on the Kolyvagin construction as follows. Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over Q (i.e., elliptic curve 124), such that III(E/K)[p] is non-zero for a large prime p for K=Q(√{square root over (D)}) for some fundamental discriminant D<0. Suppose that 1 is a prime satisfying the Kolyvagin conditions, such that d_(1,p)∈H¹(K,E)[p] is everywhere locally trivial but is globally non-trivial. In other words, suppose that d_(1,p) is a non-zero element of III(E/K). The element d_(1,p) is used to hash an arbitrary message as follows:

-   Given a message M in bytes (i.e., original data), hash M into an     element r(M)∈F_(p) defined by using the first log₂p bits of SHA1     (M). In this implementation, SHA1 is the secure hash algorithm which     hashes a byte stream to a 160-bit binary number; is assumed that p     has less than 160 bits. -   Define a hash function h:{0,1}*→III(E/K) by setting     h(M):=r(M)·d_(1,p).

We now describe (in reference to FIGS. 2 and 3) how Cassels-Tate pairings are used to cryptographically process select data.

An Exemplary Procedure to Cryptographically Process Data

FIG. 2 shows an exemplary procedure 200 to hash a byte stream into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety. The operations of procedure are described with respect to components of FIG. 1. The left-most digit of a component reference number identifies the particular figure in which the component first appears.

At block 202, signing/encrypting module 110 generates Shafarevich-Tate group 114 (FIG. 1) from cohomology group 124 and abelian variety A over a number field K. At block 204, signing/encrypting module 110 determines a Cassels-Tate pairing (see “other data” 112) based on the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 and a secret, r, which is the number of times that an element x of the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 was composed with itself to obtain the public key, r*x. At block 206, the selected information (e.g., original data) is cryptographically processed as a function of the determined Cassels-Tate pairing. For example, signing/encrypting module 110 encrypts or signs the data as a function of the determined Cassels-Tate pairing. Analogously, verifying/decrypting module 120 respectively decrypts or verifies the data as a function of a generated Cassels-Tate pairing. An exemplary procedure for signing data and verifying signed data using a Cassels-Tate pairing is described below in reference to FIG. 3.

The particular pairing-based cryptology algorithm selected at block 206 to process (e.g., sign or encrypt, and analogously verify or decrypt) the data is arbitrary and a function of the particular algorithm selected for implementation. For example, in one implementation, operations of block 206 use an identity-based encryption algorithm as described below in reference to FIG. 4, or alternatively, an algorithm based on key issuing, signatures (plain, blind, proxy, ring, undeniable, etc.), encryption, authenticated or broadcast encryption, etc., to cryptographically process the data. In another implementation, block 206 uses an algorithm based on key agreement, key distribution, signatures (e.g., short or group signatures, etc.), etc., to cryptographically process the data. In yet a different implementation, block 206 uses a different pairing-based cryptographic algorithm to cryptographically process the data.

An Exemplary Procedure for Signing Data using a Cassels-Tate Pairing

FIG. 3 shows an exemplary procedure 300 to cryptographically sign data using a Cassels-Tate pairing. The particular pairing-based cryptology algorithm selected to sign the data is arbitrary and a function of the particular cryptology architecture selected for implementation. The operations of procedure 300 are described with respect to components of FIG. 1. The left-most digit of a component reference number identifies the particular figure in which the component first appears.

In this exemplary implementation, signing/encrypting module 110, which in this implementation is a signing module, and so referred to as such, implements a signature scheme. At block 302, signing module 110 generates Shafarevich-Tate group 114 from cohomology group 124 an abelian variety A over a number field K. At block 304, signing module 110 selects and makes public an element x in III(A/K), in the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of A. At block 306, signing module 110 generates two isogenies, φ and ψ, of degree m, from A to A (e.g., via integer multiplication). There are numerous known techniques that can be used to generate the isogenies. At block 308, signing module 110 obtains two random points, P and P′, generators for the kernels of A_(ψ) and Â_({circumflex over (ψ)}), where {circumflex over (ψ)} is the dual isogeny Â→Â.

Any two parties (e.g., Alice and Bob) that desire to encrypt or sign original data and/or decrypt or verify associated encrypted or signed data 118, and/or establish a common secret, generate respective public keys 128. At block 310, a party that wants to generate a respective public key 128 generates a respective secret random number, r, and composes x with itself in the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 r times to generate a new element (the r^(th) multiple of x, r*x). The number r is a user's (e.g., party A or party B) secret 130. The secret 130 is not shared. At block 312, signing/encrypting module 110 publishes this new element as a public key 128.

At block 314, signing module 110 signs original data using the Shafarevich-Tate group(s) 114 to generate signed data 118. For example, in one implementation, when signing module implements a signature scheme, signing module 110 utilizes hash function, h, from the data space {0,1}″ into III(Â/K) to sign original data, M (e.g., a plaintext message). (An exemplary such hash function is described above in the section titled “The Hash Function.”) The data space {0,1}″ is the set of bit-strings of some length n. Similarly, the data space {0,1}* is the set of bit-strings of some length *. This is accomplished by computing the hash of M, h(M) as an element of III(Â/K), then taking the r th multiple r*h(M) to obtain the signature σ=r*h(M). For purposes of illustration, the hash of M, represented as M′, Cassels-Tate pairing, and the associated signature σ are shown as a respective portion of “other data” 112.

At block 316, signing module 110 sends M together with the signature σ to a target entity such as to an application executing on networked computing device 104. The application implements or otherwise accesses logic implemented by verifying/decrypting module 120. At block 318, and responsive to receiving M and signature σ, verifying/decrypting module 120, which is this implementation is a verifying module, validates or verfies the signature of M by hashing M (i.e., as described above in the section titled “The Hash Function”), computing Cassels-Tate pairing 122, CT(r*x,h(M)), and comparing it with CT(x,σ). If they are the same then the signature on the message is deemed valid.

Evaluating a Cassels-Tate Pairing

This section indicates how, in certain cases, operations of verifying/decrypting module 120, at block 318, can compute a Cassels-Tate pairing 122 explicitly. In this implementation, attention is focused on the special case where an explicit formula is provided for the pairing 122. Exemplary notation is also provided.

-   1. It is assumed that the abelian variety A is an elliptic curve E     defined over a number field K. Then E is canonically isomorphic to     its dual Ê. -   2. It is assumed that there exists an isogeny φ of E of degree p     which is defined over K. We will let ψ be the dual isogeny,     ψ:={circumflex over (φ)}. Then E_(φ)≅Z/pZ and E_(ψ)≅Z/pZ. -   3. It is assumed that the full p-torsion of E is defined over K. Let     P∈E(K) be a generator for the kernel of ψ, and let P′∈E(K) be a     generator for the kernel of φ={circumflex over (ψ)}. -   4. It is assumed that the map ψ: E_(p)→E_(φ) has a Galois invariant     section s: E_(φ)→E_(p). -   5. Let s′ be the dual section. Then we let Q:=s′P′.

Since we have fixed φ and ψ we will from now on refer to the local pairings simply as <,>_(v).

Exemplary Local Pairing in terms of Hilbert Norm Residue Symbol

Let φ be the isogeny of E of degree p. As above, let P∈E(K) be a generator for the kernel of {circumflex over (φ)}. Let D_(P) a divisor on E over K which represents P, and let ƒ_(P)∈K(E) be a function satisfying (ƒ_(P))=pD _(P). We have the following lemma.

Lemma 3: Let R∈E(K), and let D_(R) be a divisor equivalent to (R)−(O) and not meeting the support of D_(P).

-   1. We have ƒ_(P)(φD_(R))∈(K*)^(p). -   2. Let g be a function whose divisor div g has disjoint support from     D_(P). We have ƒ_(P)(div g)∈(K*)^(p). -   3. If D′_(P) is defined over K and linearly equivalent to D_(P), and     ƒ′_(P)∈E(K) is such that (ƒ′_(P))=mD′_(p), then ƒ_(P)≡ƒ′_(P)g^(p)     mod K* for some g∈K(E).     Proof. Statement 2, immediately above, follows from Weil     reciprocity. It follows from Lemma 3 that the map ƒ_(P) gives us a     well defined map     ι_(P) :E(K)/φE(K)→K*/(K*)^(p)     This is just the Tate pairing. It follows from (3) that this map     only depends on P, not on the divisor chosen to represent it. On the     other hand, since P is rational over K, we have a Galois map     E _(φ)→μ_(p) aae _(φ)(a,P),     which induces a map     j _(P) :H ¹(K,E _(φ))→H ¹(K,μ _(p))=K*/(K*)^(p),     where the equality is the map that comes from Kummer theory.

Lemma 4: We have j_(P)oi_(φ)=ι_(P). Here, i_(φ) is the map from the short exact sequence of cohomology i_(φ):E(K)/φE(K)→H¹(K,E_(φ)). The symbol “o” denotes composition of maps. Now let P,P′ and Q be as above, i.e. P is a generator for the kernel of ψ, P′ is a generator for the kernel of φ={circumflex over (ψ)} and Q:=s′P′, where s′ is the dual section. Before we proceed consider the following two definitions.

-   Definition 5. The Hilbert norm residue symbol (,)_(p) is a map     (,)_(p):K_(v)*/(K_(v)*)^(p)×K_(v)*/(K_(v)*)^(p)→μ_(p). It is defined     by (x,y)_(p):=(x^(1/p))^(([ y,K) ^(v) ^(]−1)). Here y is any element     of K* mapping to y and [ y,K_(v)] denotes the Artin symbol. -   Definition 6. Let ζ,ζ′∈μ_(p). Let Ind_(ζ)(ζ′) be the unique element     u∈1/mZ/Z such that ζ^(μv)=ζ′. We can now prove the following     proposition.

Proposition 2: Under the identifications H ¹(K _(v),μ_(p))=K _(v)*/(K _(v)*)^(p) and H ²(K _(v),μ_(p){circle around (×)}μ_(p))=H ²(K _(v),μ_(p)){circle around (×)}μ_(p)=(p ⁻¹ Z/Z){circle around (×)}μ_(p)=μ_(p) the Hilbert norm residue symbol (,)_(p) may be identified with the cup product pairing H ¹(K _(v),μ_(p))×H ¹(K _(v),μ_(p))→H ²(K _(v),μ_(p){circle around (×)}μ_(p)). Proof. This follows from the discussion in Serre, Local Fields, Chapter XIV. We can now prove the following theorem that relates the local pairing to the Hilbert symbol.

Theorem 8: Let x,y∈E(K_(v))/φE(K_(v)). We have <x,y>_(v)=Ind_(e) _(ψ) _((P,P′))[(ι_(Q)(x₁),ι_(P)(y))_(p)], (1), where x₁ is any lifting of x to E(K_(v))/pE(K_(v)). Proof. See, Theorem 2.6 in McCallum.

Representation of elements in the Selmer group S_(φ) are now described. Let v be the distinguished place as above where the local pairing is nontrivial. To each element ζ∈S_(φ), we associate a point T∈E(K_(v))/φE(K_(v)) by letting T:=ι_(v,φ)(ζ). Here ι_(v,φ) is as in Theorem 1 and as described with respect to the Cassels-Tate pairing as local pairings. This element T∈E(Q_(p)) uniquely represents the element ζ∈S_(φ)(E/K).

Evaluating the local pairing <S,T>_(v) for S,T∈K_(v)=Q_(p) is now described. By Theorem 8 the local pairing 126 can be evaluated as an application of two Tate pairings 122 and one Hilbert symbol (see, “other data” 112). In one implementation, projective coordinates are used to avoid divisions, and denominator cancellation techniques are used to evaluate the Tate pairing.

Exemplary Identity-Based Encryption

FIG. 4 shows an exemplary procedure 400 of system 100 for identify-based encryption using the Cassels-Tate pairing on the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety. The operations of procedure 400 are described with respect to components of FIG. 1. The left-most digit of a component reference number identifies the particular figure in which the component first appears. Operations of procedure 400 are based on the following: let x be an element, possibly a generator, of the Shafarevich-Tate group 114 of the dual of an abelian variety, and let r be a random integer less than the group order of the Shafarevich-Tate group.

At block 402, a program module 106, for example, signing/encrypting module 110 sets a public key 128 to equal to r*x. In the implementation of exemplary procedure 400, module 110 is an encryption module and is referred to as such with respect to the procedure. The integer r is the master key. At block 404, the program module 106 selects a cryptographic hash function h₁ from the data space {0,1}* into the non-zero elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group. An exemplary such cryptographic hash function is described above in the section titled “The Hash Function.” At block 406, the program module 106 selects a cryptographic hash function h₂ from the target space of the Cassels-Tate pairing 116 into the data space {0,1}*.

At block 408, the program module 106 selects a third cryptographic hash function h₃ from two copies of the data space {0,1}* into the non-zero integers modulo the group order of the Shafarevich-Tate group 114. An exemplary such cryptographic hash function is described above in the section titled “The Hash Function.” At block 410, the program module 106 selects a fourth cryptographic hash function h₄ from a copy of the data space {0,1}* into itself. At block 412, and for a given identity string, ID in {0,1}*, an authority for the system 100 (e.g., a program module 106 such as encrypting module 110) generates a corresponding private key by hashing the identity string into an element of the Shafarevich-Tate group 114, h₁(ID) and then setting the private key to be r*h₁(ID). For purposes of illustration, such an identity string and the private key are shown as respective portions of “other data” 112.

At block 414, to encrypt a message M in the data space {0,1}* using the public key ID, the program module 106 computes the hash of ID into the Shafarevich-Tate group, h₁(ID). The message M is a respective portion of “other data” 112. At block 416, the program module 106 selects a random string s in the data space {0,1}*. At block 418, let a=h₃(s,M). The program module 106 encrypts the message 118 as follows E=(a*x, s+h₂(c_(ID) ^(a)), M+h₄(s)), where c_(ID) is the Cassels-Tate pairing 116 of h₁(ID) and r*x; the + symbol represents an XOR operation of bit strings.

Decryption of the message can be accomplished as follows. The decryptor 120 possesses the private key, D=r*h₁(ID), associated to the identity string ID. The decryptor receives cipher text E=(F,G,H). The decryptor sets s=G+h₂(CT(D,F)). Then the decryptor sets the message M equal to M=H+h₄(s). Then the decryptor sets a=h₃(s,M), and tests that the received value F is equal to a*x. If not, the decryptor rejects the message.

An Exemplary Operating Environment

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a suitable computing environment in which hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety during cryptographic processing of data using a Cassels-Tate pairing may be fully or partially implemented. Exemplary computing environment 500 is only one example of a suitable computing environment for the exemplary system of FIG. 1 and exemplary operations of FIGS. 2-4, and is not intended to suggest any limitation as to the scope of use or functionality of systems and methods the described herein. Neither should computing environment 500 be interpreted as having any dependency or requirement relating to any one or combination of components illustrated in computing environment 500.

The methods and systems described herein are operational with numerous other general purpose or special purpose computing system, environments or configurations. Examples of well-known computing systems, environments, and/or configurations that may be suitable for use include, but are not limited to, personal computers, server computers, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, distributed computing environments that include any of the above systems or devices, and so on. Compact or subset versions of the framework may also be implemented in clients of limited resources, such as handheld computers, or other computing devices. The invention is practiced in a distributed computing environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network. In a distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices.

With reference to FIG. 5, an exemplary system for hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety includes a general purpose computing device in the form of a computer 510 implementing, for example, system 100 of FIG. 1. The following described aspects of computer 510 are exemplary implementations of computing devices 102 and/or 104 of FIG. 1. Components of computer 510 may include, but are not limited to, processing unit(s) 520, a system memory 530, and a system bus 521 that couples various system components including the system memory to the processing unit 520. The system bus 521 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. By way of example and not limitation, such architectures may include Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, Enhanced ISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) local bus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus also known as Mezzanine bus.

A computer 510 typically includes a variety of computer-readable media. Computer-readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by computer 510 and includes both volatile and nonvolatile media, removable and non-removable media. By way of example, and not limitation, computer-readable media may comprise computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media includes volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and which can be accessed by computer 510.

Communication media typically embodies computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and includes any information delivery media. The term “modulated data signal” means a signal that has one or more of its characteristics set or changed in such a manner as to encode information in the signal. By way of example and not limitation, communication media includes wired media such as a wired network or a direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless media. Combinations of the any of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.

System memory 530 includes computer storage media in the form of volatile and/or nonvolatile memory such as read only memory (ROM) 531 and random access memory (RAM) 532. A basic input/output system 533 (BIOS), containing the basic routines that help to transfer information between elements within computer 510, such as during start-up, is typically stored in ROM 531. RAM 532 typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to and/or presently being operated on by processing unit 520. By way of example and not limitation, FIG. 5 illustrates operating system 534, application programs 535, other program modules 536, and program data 537.

The computer 510 may also include other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media. By way of example only, FIG. 5 illustrates a hard disk drive 541 that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatile magnetic media, a magnetic disk drive 551 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile magnetic disk 552, and an optical disk drive 555 that reads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk 556 such as a CD ROM or other optical media. Other removable/non-removable, volatile/nonvolatile computer storage media that can be used in the exemplary operating environment include, but are not limited to, magnetic tape cassettes, flash memory cards, digital versatile disks, digital video tape, solid state RAM, solid state ROM, and the like. The hard disk drive 541 is typically connected to the system bus 521 through a non-removable memory interface such as interface 540, and magnetic disk drive 551 and optical disk drive 555 are typically connected to the system bus 521 by a removable memory interface, such as interface 550.

The drives and their associated computer storage media discussed above and illustrated in FIG. 5, provide storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the computer 510. In FIG. 5, for example, hard disk drive 541 is illustrated as storing operating system 544, application programs 545, other program modules 546, and program data 547. Note that these components can either be the same as or different from operating system 534, application programs 535, other program modules 536, and program data 537. Application programs 535 includes, for example program modules of computing devices 102 or 104 of FIG. 1. Program data 537 includes, for example, program data of computing devices 102 or 104 of FIG. 1. Operating system 544, application programs 545, other program modules 546, and program data 547 are given different numbers here to illustrate that they are at least different copies.

A user may enter commands and information into the computer 510 through input devices such as a keyboard 562 and pointing device 561, commonly referred to as a mouse, trackball or touch pad. Other input devices (not shown) may include a microphone, joystick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 520 through a user input interface 560 that is coupled to the system bus 521, but may be connected by other interface and bus structures, such as a parallel port, game port or a universal serial bus (USB).

A monitor 591 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 521 via an interface, such as a video interface 590. In addition to the monitor, computers may also include other peripheral output devices such as printer 596 and audio device(s) 597, which may be connected through an output peripheral interface 595.

The computer 510 operates in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as a remote computer 580. In one implementation, remote computer 580 represents computing device 102 or networked computer 104 of FIG. 1. The remote computer 580 may be a personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and as a function of its particular implementation, may include many or all of the elements described above relative to the computer 510, although only a memory storage device 581 has been illustrated in FIG. 5. The logical connections depicted in FIG. 5 include a local area network (LAN) 571 and a wide area network (WAN) 573, but may also include other networks. Such networking environments are commonplace in offices, enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.

When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 510 is connected to the LAN 571 through a network interface or adapter 570. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 510 typically includes a modem 572 or other means for establishing communications over the WAN 573, such as the Internet. The modem 572, which may be internal or external, may be connected to the system bus 521 via the user input interface 560, or other appropriate mechanism. In a networked environment, program modules depicted relative to the computer 510, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote memory storage device. By way of example and not limitation, FIG. 5 illustrates remote application programs 585 as residing on memory device 581. The network connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishing a communications link between the computers may be used.

Conclusion

Although the systems and methods for hashing byte streams into elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group of an abelian variety have been described in language specific to structural features and/or methodological operations or actions, it is understood that the implementations defined in the appended claims are not necessarily limited to the specific features or actions described. Rather, the specific features and operations of system 100 are disclosed as exemplary forms of implementing the claimed subject matter.

For example, although signing/encryption module 110 (FIG. 1) and verifying/decrypting module 120 (FIG. 1) are shown on different respective computing devices (i.e., devices 102 and 104), in another implementation, logic and data associated with these program modules can be implemented on a single computing device (e.g., device 102 or 104) independent of a second computing device.

In another example, and although the systems and methods for Cassels-Tate pairing have been described in exemplary signing and identity-based implementations, the systems and methods are also applicable to all pairings-based applications on the Shafarevich-Tate group such as those indicated above in paragraphs [0014] and [0015].

In yet another example, in one implementation the public element x is chosen from the Shafarevich-Tate group of the dual of A, and the messages M can be hashed into the Shafarevich-Tate group of A. Similarly for the Identity-Based Encryption and other applications, the roles of A and the dual of A can be switched. 

1. A computer-implemented method comprising: generating a Shafarevich-Tate group from an abelian variety; determining a Cassels-Tate pairing based on elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group; and cryptographically processing data based on the Cassels-Tate pairing by hashing the data into an element of the Shafarevich-Tate group using Kolyvagin cohomology classes.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the cohomology group is associated to an abelian variety selected from an elliptic curve or a Jacobian variety of a higher genus curve.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the Cassels-Tate pairing is a sum of local pairings.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic processing is a signature-based verification scheme or an identity-based encryption scheme.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic processing selects a public element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group of the dual of A, and messages M are hashed into the Shafarevich-Tate group of A.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic processing is based on the Shafarevich-Tate group and a dual of A, wherein roles of A and the dual of A are switched.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises signing the data by hashing the data with hashing function h acting on data space {0,1}*, the data being hashed into III(Â/K).
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises: selecting an element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group; selecting a random number r; composing the element x, r times with itself to generate a public key; and wherein r is maintained as a secret.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises: selecting an element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group; generating a public key equal to the r-th multiple of the element x, r being the secret; and publishing the element x, the public key r*x and the abelian variety so that the data can be decrypted or verified by an independent entity.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the Cassels-Tate pairing is evaluated on different inputs and their values are compared, and wherein the method further comprises: receiving a public key generated from a secret determined as a function of an element of the Shafarevich group; and decrypting or verifying the data as a function of the public key and the Cassels-Tate pairing.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein the signature σ=r*h(M) and message M are transmitted, and wherein the method further comprises verifying the data by: (a) constructing the Kolyvagin cohomology classes to produce provably non-trivial elements; (b) hashing the data using the non-trivial elements; (c) computing a second Cassels-Tate pairing using hashed data, CT(r*x,h(M)); and (d) comparing the second Cassels-Tate pairing with the first Cassels-Tate pairing, CT(x,σ).
 12. The method of claim 1, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises signing the data by: computing a hash h of the data such that h(the data) is an element of III(Â/K); determining an r th multiple r*h(the data), wherein r is a random number; and evaluating the Cassels-Tate pairing to obtain signature σ=r*h(M).
 13. A computer-implemented method comprising: generating a Shafarevich-Tate group from an abelian variety; determining a Cassels-Tate pairing based on elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group; and cryptographically processing data based on the Cassels-Tate pairing by: selecting a public element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group of a dual of A; and hashing a messages M into the Shafarevich-Tate group of A using a Kolyvagin construction.
 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the cohomology group is associated to an abelian variety selected from an elliptic curve or a Jacobian variety of a higher genus curve.
 15. The method of claim 13, wherein the Cassels-Tate pairing is a sum of local pairings.
 16. The method of claim 13, wherein the cryptographic processing is a signature-based verification scheme or an identity-based encryption scheme.
 17. The method of claim 13, wherein the cryptographic processing is based on the Shafarevich-Tate group and a dual of A, wherein roles of A and the dual of A are switched.
 18. The method of claim 13, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises: selecting an element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group; selecting a random number r; composing the element x, r times with itself to generate a public key; and wherein r is a maintained as a secret.
 19. The method of claim 13, wherein cryptographically processing further comprises: selecting an element x from the Shafarevich-Tate group; composing the element x, r times with itself to generate a public key, r being the secret; and publishing the element x, the public key r*x and the abelian variety so that the data can be decrypted or verified by an independent entity.
 20. A computing device comprising: generating means to generate a Shafarevich-Tate group from a cohomology group; determining means to determine a Cassels-Tate pairing based on elements of the Shafarevich-Tate group; and cryptographically processing means to cryptographically process data based on the Cassels-Tate pairing. 